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Abstract 
Just as the 1929 Stock Market Crash discredited Classical economic theory and 
policy and opened the way for Keynesianism, a consequence of the collapse of 
confidence in financial markets and the banking system – and the effect that this 
has had on the global macro economy – is currently discrediting the 
‘conventional wisdom’ of neo-liberalism. This paper argues that at the heart of 
the crisis is a breakdown in governance that has its roots in the co-evolution of 
political and economic developments and of economic theory and policy since 
the 1929 Stock Market Crash and the Great Depression that followed. However, 
while many are looking back to the Great Depression and to the theories and 
policies that seemed to contribute to recovery during the first part of the 
twentieth century, we argue that the current context is different from the earlier 
one; and there are more recent events that may provide better insight into the 
causes and contributing factors giving rise to the present crisis and to the 
implications for theory and policy that follow. 
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‘Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals.  
The governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of 
resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those 
resources.  The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of 
individuals, corporations and society.’  (Cadbury 2000) 
 
 
Introduction 
The form taken by governance is important for sustainability – of organizations 
and of the broader socio-economic system of which they form a part.  At both 
levels, sustainability depends upon the existence of an effective framework for 
establishing strategic objectives, determining the most appropriate and effective 
means of achieving them, and monitoring performance.  It also requires 
appropriate and enforceable mechanisms by which individuals and groups are 
incentivised and monitored.  These requirements are emphasised by the 
OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance: ‘the presence of an effective 
corporate governance system, within an individual company and across an 
economy as a whole,’ is viewed as central to the ‘confidence that is necessary 
for the proper functioning of a market economy’ (OECD 2004: 11).   
 
Recently, this confidence has been badly shaken by instability in the world’s 
financial markets in which the banks played a contributing role and by the 
resulting economic slow down, analysis of which is currently dominating 
economic commentary and policy making. In this context, parallels are being 
drawn between contemporary events and the 1929 Stock Market crash and 
Great Depression of the 1930s; and many are looking backward for 
explanations and remedies that seemed to be effective in the past. However, 
while there may be interesting parallels between these two periods of history, 
there are also important differences in the nature of markets (whether for 
products, labour, capital or finance) and in the effectiveness of corporate 
governance and instruments of policy.  There is also perhaps a need to pay 
closer attention to more recent events in economic history, such as the high 
yield ‘junk’ bond episode and the Savings and Loans Crisis in the United States 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Both of these events should be considered early 
stages in the development of the currently evolving financial and economic 
crisis. 
 
This paper traces the current financial market crisis to a breakdown in 
governance that has its roots in the co-evolution of political and economic 
developments and of theory and policy since the 1929 Stock Market Crash.  
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Section one outlines developments in economic theory and policy, and their 
influence on events in an increasingly global political and economic 
environment.  Section two examines advances relating to the firm, organizations 
and corporate governance.  Section three expands the analysis to account for 
increasing globalization and the resulting challenges for effective regulation and 
governance.  Sections four and five outline the anatomy of the current financial 
crisis and establish its place in socio-economic history.  From the still unfolding 
events, Section six draws conclusions and highlights the implications for 
corporate governance reform that follow from them. 
 
1. Developments in theory and policy and the globalization of markets 
In his book The Affluent Society, Galbraith, argued that the economic ideas in 
vogue at any point in time – the ‘conventional wisdom’ – are inherently 
conservative and give way, not to new ideas, but to ‘the massive onslaught of 
circumstances with which they cannot contend’ (Galbraith, 1999, p.17). This 
creates the environment in which different ideas find favour and reconstitute the 
conventional wisdom. One example of this process was the replacement of Neo-
classical by Keynesian conventional wisdom, triggered by the mass 
unemployment and poverty of the inter-war years, which eventually led to the 
state’s management of the economy. The growing inflationary crisis of the 
1970s may also be regarded as a massive onslaught of circumstance. But this 
time the conventional wisdom reverted to pre-Keynesian notions that success in 
combating inflation depends on controlling the money supply whilst efficiency 
in the use of resources is most effectively secured by markets. As will be seen 
below, analogous developments can be observed in theory and policy relating to 
corporate governance, with the efficient market hypothesis emerging to provide 
the orthodox explanation for – and justification of – the role of the stock market 
in reorganising industry and its ownership in the Anglo/American productive 
system.  
 
During the Great Depression which began in 1929, failure of the laissez faire 
system to deliver the economic and social benefits it was theorized to, triggered 
a sea-change in economic theory and policy.  In this, Keynes’ argument that 
economies settle at less than full employment because effective demand lags 
rising income opened the way for the state to extend its governance of the 
economy to counter involuntary joblessness by inducing additional expenditure.  
By invoking a role for the state in generating full employment, Keynes broke 
with the classical economists in their belief that this was best secured by market 
forces. Whilst not averse to the classical idea that supply and demand work 
through markets to determine relative prices (i.e. those of one good in terms of 
others), Keynes refuted the classical Quantity Theory notion of a direct 
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transmission of the supply of money into the general price level. Rather, he 
argued that the money supply operates indirectly on the level of economic 
activity, via the rate of interest. When the economy is below full employment, 
lowering the rate of interest by increasing the money supply stimulates 
economic activity by inducing investment. This is augmented, via the 
employment multiplier, by an increase in the level of consumption.  It is only 
when the economy is at or close to full employment that an increase in the 
money supply spills over into the general price level, by increasing effective 
demand above effective supply and pulling up prices.   
 
Keynes also argued against the idea that economic agents have perfect foresight, 
or even that they know enough about the range of possible future outcomes to 
use mathematical probability as a means of predicting future prospects.  Instead, 
he reasoned that in financial markets there is profound ignorance of the long-
term trends in the real economy, and that these markets tend to operate on 
relatively short-term time horizons.  In Keynes’ view, an unknowable future 
creates in financial markets ‘waves of irrational psychology,’ that swing from 
wild exuberance to overwhelming gloom (Keynes 1936).  In such an 
environment, individuals, unable to figure out what lies ahead, tend to surrender 
to the greater wisdom of the crowd. The tendency is for individuals and 
organisations trading in these markets to adopt the convention that periods of 
prosperity (or of dearth) will continue indefinitely.  As a result, the system is 
‘shocked’ into sharp reversals when the market trends show signs of change. 
Unregulated financial markets are therefore inherently unstable. 
 
a. The inter-war years and the transformation of economic theory and policy 
in the US and Britain 
The British Government responded to post-war economic problems by reverting 
to pre-war laissez faire neo-classical economic and financial orthodoxy. This 
dictated a reduction in government expenditure to balance the budget, 
repayment of huge war-time borrowings, a return to the Gold Standard at 1914 
parity, and the use of dear money to defend the exchange rate. The Treasury 
single-mindedly pursued these policy objectives until 1939, despite continuous 
changes in political, social and economic circumstances.   
 
The contradiction between the Treasury’s economic strategy and the 
requirements of unemployment policy became apparent in the deep recession 
which followed the frantic re-stocking boom of 1919-20 (Howson, 1975).  
However, high unemployment and the balance of payment deficit were 
officially attributed to economic and political disturbances stemming from the 
Great War, which had disrupted Britain’s traditional export markets and 
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radically increased production costs. Consequently, the Treasury reasoned that 
the restoration of economic normality required wage reductions to restore 
Britain’s prices to their pre-war relative levels. The understanding was that the 
British economy had strayed from equilibrium; and cost and price tweakings 
were required to guide it back.  
 
But the problems of Britain’s post-war economy were in fact deeply structural, 
stemming from a continuous decline in export competitiveness of Britain’s 
staple industries - coal, cotton goods and steel – as other countries had 
industrialised. These trends dated back to the late 19th century and had been 
exacerbated by the disruptions to home production and world trade caused by 
the First World War; and reversing their effects required a fundamental 
reorganisation and reorientation of the British economy. 
 
In a major step to re-establish its version of economic normality, the Treasury 
restored the Gold Standard to its 1914 parity in 1924. The resulting price 
deflation squeezed the profits of British firms, resulting in attempts by 
employers to pass the cuts on into wages. This precipitated the 1926 General 
Strike and a six month walk-out by the coal miners. Despite the resulting 
economic, social and political disruption, continued high unemployment and a 
persistent balance of payments deficit, the Treasury continued its restrictive 
economic policy. In doing so, it ignored widespread demands for credit easing 
and public works to reduce unemployment, in which Keynes was a leading 
light. Thus, whilst the US was experiencing a prolonged period of prosperity, 
Britain suffered what Arndt described as ‘the years of semi-stagnation’ (op.cit., 
p130) and which Sue Howson later referred to as ‘the doldrums’ (op.cit., p30).    
 
The only permanent solution to Britain’s economic problems lay in increasing 
home demand to compensate for shrinking export markets, together with 
process, product and organisational innovation. In this, the lead had passed to 
the United States, where from 1922 to 1929 the economy grew rapidly and 
employment remained high.1 During this period, the driving force for US 
growth was rapid organisational and technical change, high levels of investment 
in manufacturing and construction (especially house building), and a sharp 
increase in consumer expenditure, especially on cars and other consumer 
durables. But this revolution was not confined to the way the economy was 
organised and the level of expenditure; it was also related to the way the 
economy was theorised.  
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In economics, there had developed a ‘vigorous, diverse and distinctly American 
literature dealing with monetary economics and the business cycle’. (Laidler, 
1999, p211). The analysis was essentially institutional and non-neoclassical; 
and there was little opposition amongst American economists to counter-
cyclical fiscal and monetary policy, although there was considerable dispute 
about the effectiveness of such government intervention.2  In general, American 
economists during the 1920s were optimistic about the future (op. cit., p.212).  
 
Elements of American economic thinking during the 1920s anticipated 
Keynesian analysis and policy recommendations, tendencies which were 
reinforced by the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. (op. cit., pps 211-212).  
Important insights into these developments can be found in a Memorandum 
prepared by L.B. Currie, P.T. Ellsworth and H.D. White in January 1932.3  
 
‘[This Memorandum] sketches out an explanation of the then developing 
Great Contraction, as well as a comprehensive and radical policy program 
for dealing with it … the main domestic component of that program was 
to be vigorously expansionary open-market operations and substantial 
deficit spending that, particularly  in its early stage, was to be financed by 
money creation; its international dimension involved a return to free trade 
and serious efforts to resolve the problems of international indebtedness 
that had originated in the Great War and in the Treaty of Versailles.’ 
(Laidler, 2002, p 516). 
 
The downturn in the US economy began in the summer of 1929 with exhaustion 
of the boom in investment and consumption. It was intensified, but not caused, 
by the stock market crash in October. Between 1929 and 1933, money income 
fell 53 percent, real income fell 36 percent and unemployment rose to 25 
percent of the workforce. Chaos in the banking sector culminated in a major 
banking crisis in 1933, accompanied by a series of bank failures. When the 
Roosevelt administration took office, the US was suffering ‘from the most 
extreme prostration which any capitalist country had ever experienced in peace 
time’ (Arndt 1944, p.34). In response, the ‘New Deal’ reforms of 1933 through 
1937 were introduced. According to Arndt (1944), the New Deal ‘was the most 
spectacular attempt that was made after the great depression to promote 
recovery by means of a deliberate expansionist policy as the chief stimulus of 
economic activity, and without recourse to totalitarian control of the economic 
system’ (loc. cit.). From 1933 to the third quarter of 1937, the economy 
recovered. But at its highest, industrial production remained 4 percent below the 
level achieved in 1929, and unemployment remained 4 to 5 million above what 
could be regarded as an ‘irreducible minimum’ (op. cit., p. 61); and fears of 
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possible inflationary effects checked New Deal expansionism, leading to a 
sharp recession late in 1937. Recovery followed, but it was not until the Second 
World War that the US economy reached anything like full employment. 
  
The New Deal reforms embraced counter-cyclical spending by government in 
providing economic relief and in stimulating the economy; the gold standard 
was abandoned and the dollar was allowed to float on foreign exchange 
markets. During this period, the US federal government also assumed an active 
role in managing the economy and the money supply, in controlling prices, in 
providing a social welfare net and in supporting the interests of workers and 
trade unions.  The Social Security Act of 1935, for example, provided the 
framework for the American welfare system. Under this legislation, a system of 
welfare benefits for poor families and handicapped people was set up as was a 
system of unemployment insurance and universal retirement pensions, funded 
by payroll taxes.  In terms of banking reform, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) was created to insure deposits of up to $5,000, thereby 
avoiding the instability associated with a run on the banks.  The Glass Steagall 
Act of 1933 mandated a separation of commercial and retail banking from 
investment banking.  Commercial and retail banks accept deposits from savers 
and extend loans to borrowers while investment banks deal in shares, bonds and 
other financial instruments, which they both underwrite and issue. The Glass 
Steagall Act legislation was designed to protect the money in depositors’ 
accounts in commercial and retail banks from potentially risky speculative 
activities undertaken by investment banks. 
The stimulus for economic recovery in Britain came not from fiscal policy, but 
from monetary policy designed for a quite different purpose. During the early 
1930s, in a continuing attempt to balance the budget, the National government 
cut unemployment benefits, resulting in political turmoil that exacerbated the 
economic crisis. The Treasury’s attempt to defend sterling depleted foreign 
currency reserves, despite their supplementation by substantial loans from 
abroad. Britain was finally forced off the gold standard in 19314, after the 
Macmillan report revealed how parlous Britain’s short-term debtor position was 
and the May report forecast a budget deficit of £120 million by April 1932 
(Moggridge, 1992 pp. 511 and 522-533). Following abandonment of the gold 
standard, sterling depreciated 30 percent, creating the space for a reduction in 
interest rates to stimulate economic recovery. However, the immediate objective 
of the cut in the bank rate from 6 percent in September 1931 to 2 percent in 
June 1932 was to facilitate repayment of the 1917 War Loan by converting the 
cost of financing from 5 percent to 3.5 percent, generating substantial budgetary 
savings (Arndt 1944, p. 122). Apart from a brief period in 1939, the bank rate 
was maintained at 2 percent until 1951, keeping interest rates low in the money 
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markets. As a result, cheap and plentiful money triggered a major house 
building boom which led the economic recovery from 1933 to 1937, after which 
it was sustained by re-armament.  
 
The semi-stagnation imposed by the Treasury in the failed attempt to re-impose 
the Gold Standard at its pre-war parity, meant that Britain did not experience the 
prosperity enjoyed by the Americans during the 1920s. This was postponed to 
1933 to 1937 when, as in the States, it rested on a building boom in residential 
property and the growth of new consumer goods industries including motor-car, 
electrical and rayon. The 1930’s British boom can thus be attributed to an 
appetite for new houses and consumer goods which was converted into effective 
demand by the ready availability of cheap credit and an increase in real income. 
The latter increase was the result of both an increase in wages and profits as the 
British economy recovered and a fall in the prices of imported food and raw 
materials.  It was estimated that the terms of trade had improved to the extent 
that a representative unit of exports purchased 20 percent more imports in 1935 
than it had in 1931 (Arndt 1944, p. p131). The consumer-led boom became self-
sustaining as the income of those who were newly employed – building houses 
and manufacturing consumer goods – was spent on new houses, consumer 
goods to furnish and embellish them, and economically improved living 
standards.  By 1937 the volume of output was 50 percent higher than in 1932 
(20 percent up on 1929), unemployment had fallen by more than half (although 
it was up on 1929), non-agricultural employment rose from 10.2 million in 1929 
to 11.5 million in 1937, and there was a striking increase in productivity.   
However, the economic picture was not uniformly positive throughout the 
country.  Although unemployment fell by more than half between 1932 and 
1937, 10 percent of the population remained unemployed at the peak of the 
boom in 1937, with unemployment concentrated in the north and west where 
Britain’s traditional industries – cotton, coal, steel and shipbuilding – were 
located. Apart from steel, which partially recovered, these industries remained 
depressed and unemployment remained high, despite some migration to the 
south and east in search of employment in the infant industries located there.  
 
The British recovery continued undisturbed until 1937 when re-armament took 
over as the main driver of economic growth.  But it was not until the Second 
World War that anything close to full employment returned to the depressed 
regions in Britain. Following World War II, widespread commitment to 
Keynesian full employment and the welfare state, laid the foundations for post-
war economic prosperity in most industrialised economies5.  During this period, 
especially 1952-1960, macroeconomic performance was characterized by full-
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employment, non-inflationary growth and rapidly rising living standards; and 
this was considered ‘the golden age’ of post-war economic history.  
 
b. Globalisation and the displacement of Keynesianism by Neo-liberalism 
As the long boom progressed, however, strains began to appear. International 
competition intensified with the re-emergence of Japan and the continental 
European countries as leading industrial competitors, and with manufacturing 
growth in developing countries.  The relaxation of exchange rate controls and 
the growing importance of multi-national firms accelerated the process of 
globalisation, as firms relocated production abroad in an effort to escape the 
relatively higher labour and social welfare costs in industrial countries.  
Globalization was further encouraged by tax breaks and the cheap and docile 
labour offered by developing regions and countries. A consequence of this 
increased international mobility of capital was the onset of deindustrialisation in 
long established industrial regions. Globalization also marked the beginning of 
the end of the ability of any national government to significantly influence 
macro-economic outcomes. Nation states came under increasing pressure from 
free trade, and from the increasing concessions they were forced to make in 
order to induce global firms to invest domestically. 
 
Problems of structural adjustment were aggravated by the increasing pressure of 
sustained economic growth on world resources. The resulting sharp increase in 
primary product prices, especially oil, during the early 1970s fuelled inflation 
and contributed to balance of payments deficits in industrial countries, 
triggering deflationary policy responses.  As the emerging economic downturn 
deepened to a major world slump, economic growth slowed while inflationary 
pressures were boosted by a second round of oil price increases during the late 
1970s. The resulting ‘stagflation’6 aggravated sectoral and regional problems in 
the industrial economies and led to the widespread destruction of jobs. Problems 
of high inflation, high unemployment and de-industrialisation were augmented 
by rapidly rising state expenditure to meet the growing social security costs of 
mass redundancies and as governments attempted to salvage failing industries. 
 
As these problems were increasingly attributed to fallacies in Keynesian 
analysis and policy, there was a revival of traditional liberal economic beliefs in 
the monetary causes of inflation and in the efficacy of unrestricted markets in 
maximising economic welfare – a revival labelled ‘Neo-liberalism’.  The 
underlying assumption of Neo-liberalism, inherited from Adam Smith, is that 
self-regulating markets transform the inherent selfishness of individuals into 
general economic well-being. The market is seen as providing opportunities and 
incentives for individuals to fully exploit their property (labour in the case of 
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workers), whilst preventing them from exploiting any advantages that 
ownership might afford by throwing them into competition with others similarly 
endowed. By these means, markets were assumed to provide a forum in which 
the values of individual contributions are collectively determined by the choices 
of buyers and sellers. These judgements are delivered as market prices, which 
serve to guide labour and other resources to their most efficient use. 
Competitive markets should therefore function as equilibrating mechanisms, 
delivering both optimal economic welfare and distributional justice. 
Consequently, Neo-liberals assert that man-made laws and institutions need to 
conform to the laws of the market if they are not to be in restraint of trade and 
therefore economically damaging.  However, the relevance of this Adam 
Smithian ideology to globalised monopoly capitalism was never made clear. 
 
c. The Rise of Monetarism 
From the mid 1960s, as prices and unemployment rose together, despite 
counter-inflationary measures, Friedman (1977) revived pre-Keynesian 
monetary theory. He argued that inflation is purely a monetary phenomenon, 
caused by an increase in the money supply in excess of real growth at the 
natural level of unemployment. The imbalance is determined by state and trade 
union interventions which increase the cost of employing workers above the 
market clearing level. Overly generous welfare benefits are seen as 
discouraging work while the poor quality and low motivation of many of those 
without work is blamed for making them unemployable at the prevailing wage.  
It follows from this that attempts by government to raise employment beyond 
the natural level by increasing the money supply or by raising their own 
expenditure is counter productive because it is considered to be either 
inflationary or a cause of employment displacement elsewhere (Friedman, 
1977).  
 
Alternatively, the New Keynesians attributed stagflation directly to the degree 
of trade union monopoly which was hypothesised as raising wages above their 
market clearing rate and determining the level of unemployment at which 
inflation stabilised.  Attempts to increase expenditure beyond this level, labelled 
the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), merely add to 
inflation (Meade, 1982).  Thus, for both Neo-liberals and New Keynesians, 
there is a clear choice between higher real wages or more jobs.  
 
During the 1970s, as inflation appeared out of control, these alternative theories 
of inflation and unemployment supplanted Keynesianism as the conventional 
wisdom in macro-economics and were progressively incorporated into 
government thinking and policy.  Attempts to control inflation by monetary 
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means triggered deep recessions during the early 1980s and 1990s. The target 
for controlling inflation switched from the money supply (which proved 
uncontrollable), to exchange rates which ended when Britain was forced out of 
the European Exchange Mechanism in 1992 by speculation against sterling. At 
this point, the target for price control switched to inflation itself and interest rate 
adjustments became the primary instrument of policy. This was formalised in 
1997 when the Bank of England was granted independence and assigned 
responsibility for setting the rate of interest, a role delegated to its Monetary 
Policy Committee whose primary function was controlling inflation. The use of 
the official interest rate as the lead anti-inflationary device subverted the Bank 
of England’s tradition of using interest rates to control its lending to the banking 
sector, which in turn gave banks the unrestrained ability to increase the money 
supply.   
 
Meanwhile, the role of increasing employment and competitiveness was 
delegated to market reforms.  Markets and business were deregulated, large 
sections of the public sector privatised, and taxes on the rich cut to encourage 
enterprise. Trade unions were weakened, legal control of labour standards 
relaxed, out-of-work benefits reduced and subject to more onerous conditions, 
and wage subsidisation was introduced with the express purpose of lowering 
NAIRU and generating higher levels of employment.  In the interest of freeing 
up global financial markets, exchange rate controls were removed in October 
1979, encouraging banks and other financial institutions to move off-shore. As a 
consequence, attempts to regulate the banking and financial sector became 
pointless and any control over the money supply was lost. 
 
2. The Firm, Organizations and Corporate Governance 
 
a. Managerial capitalism 
During the 20th century, the development of mass production technologies and 
the growth in mass markets, especially in the US, encouraged even further 
growth in the scale and scope of the productive activities of corporations. As 
this happened, the ‘visible hand of management’ (Chandler, 1977) replaced the 
‘invisible hand of the market’ (Smith, 1776) in the allocation of productive 
resources. The dramatically increasing concentration of economic power in the 
form of large scale organizations, and the widening of stock ownership as 
shareholders diversified their risks, contributed to the development of theories 
of corporate governance. In this context, Berle and Means’ (1932) identification 
of a growing separation of ‘ownership’ from control of large commercial 
organizations had an important influence on legal and economic theory, giving 
form to what was described as ‘managerial capitalism’.   
 11 
 
 
As Alan Hughes (1987) explains7: 
 
‘As private enterprise industrial economies evolve, the proponents of 
the thesis of managerial capitalism argue that changes occur in the 
technical conditions and scale of production of corporations, in the 
structure of their equity and of the product markets in which they 
operate, and in their internal governance. The increasingly complex 
technological and scientific nature of industrial production requires 
specialist technical expertise, and management responsibility is 
delegated to individuals by an increasingly absentee ownership interest.  
The associated increase in the scale and capital intensity of production 
is reflected both in the growth of oligopolistic market structure and, as 
external funding increases, by an ever more dispersed pattern of share 
ownership.  Thus the fusion between management and ownership is 
broken.  Those responsible for exercising management responsibility 
came to constitute a skilled, inside, professional salaried group, 
essentially propertyless in relation to their own corporation, and hence 
separate in function and identity from the tens of thousands of 
shareholders who are its legal proprietors.  These share owners, in turn, 
form an increasingly disparate, unorganised, and uninterested group of 
principals, unwilling or unable to impose their own self-interested 
contractual conditions of employment on their manager-agents. 
Managerial behaviour is therefore discretionary behaviour, very weakly 
constrained by share-owner interests on the one hand, or by competitive 
market environments on the other.  As a result, corporate behaviour 
changes, and with it so does the nature of capitalism.’ (pp. 293-4) 
 
The changing structure of industry and its control prompted theoretical 
developments in industrial economics.  Outside the mainstream neo-classical 
tradition, Chandler (1977) identified superior managerial and production 
organisation and the economies of their large scale operation as explaining the 
emergence of large corporations; Hayek and his followers argued that market 
success and firm growth were the consequence of entrepreneurial ability in 
discovering new profit opportunities in a world of uncertainty (Kirzner 1997); 
and Schumpeter (1943) theorised that monopoly profits are necessary to 
encourage innovation. Such theories served to justify the power exercised by 
large firms as fostering economic advance. They also extended the disciplinary 
and creative role of markets for, although large size may be the reward of 
success, big firms can only survive by generating the operational and dynamic 
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efficiency by which organisations keep their feet in the market driven by ‘the 
process of creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1943). 
 
Inside the mainstream, the competitive ideal in neo-classical economics is a 
large number of firms in each industry, none large enough to influence price. 
The role of managers (usually the owners) of such firms is to adjust output in 
response to price signals transmitted by the market. With the proliferation of 
large managerially-controlled firms with substantial market control, 
conventional neo-classical wisdom evolved to argue that the success of these 
organizations served as evidence of the efficient working of market forces. The 
neo-classical case for the efficiency benefits of dominant firms was succinctly 
summarised by Coase in his seminal 1937 paper. He argued that ‘an economist 
thinks of an economic system as co-ordinated by the price mechanism’ and 
posed the question: ‘Having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by 
price movements, production would be carried out without any organisation at 
all, well might we ask why is there any organisation?’ The neo-classical 
response is that hierarchically-controlled managerial organisations evolve 
reactively to economise on transactions costs by frustrating attempts by trading 
partners to exploit bargaining power advantages derived from their monopoly 
position in supply or demand, control over specific assets, privileged access to 
information, and/or difficulties in monitoring performance (Williamson 1979, 
2002). From this perspective, the boundary between the firm and the market is 
that point at which the organisational costs of managerial hierarchy offset the 
transaction costs of market activities saved by the organisation. The role of the 
market is thus transformed from providing individuals with opportunities to 
maximise economic well-being, to one of maximising economic well-being by 
selecting out as winners those organisations most able to minimise the 
transactions costs resulting from market imperfections.  
 
An alternative explanation for the evolution of managerial capitalism is that 
large managerially-controlled firms were afforded legal and statutory status on 
liberal ideological grounds. The central idea in liberal economics is that 
freedom in markets gives individuals the right to seek out the best deal they can, 
and in doing to maximise the economic well-being of society. Consequently, 
defence of individual rights in the market is a primary responsibility of the state 
and the courts in capitalist societies. Berk (1994), in his analysis of the legal and 
political response to the increasing concentration of industry in the US, 
demonstrated how this concept of individual freedom in markets, the foundation 
of liberal economics, was extended to include large corporations. He showed 
how the proponents of what he termed ‘corporate liberalism’ followed orthodox 
liberal teaching in conceiving:  
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‘property and economic development as prior to the will of collective or 
democratic choice. “The laws of trade” its adherents are fond of saying 
“are stronger than the laws of men.” Thus, the modern corporation, like 
the liberal person, owed its existence first and foremost to private 
purpose. If the result of economic development rooted in such pre-social 
entitlement was to concentrate the market in huge monopolistic firms, 
this was deemed inevitable’ (pp 13-14).   
 
Berk went on to show that far from being the product of a natural economic 
process, the corporate form of large US businesses is a legal and political 
construct resting on the conversion of judges and politicians to corporate 
liberalism. In his study of the development of national railway systems he 
showed how in legal actions over bankruptcies in the railway system, courts 
allowed the speculator/managers – who had amalgamated individual railways 
into rail systems using vast amounts of borrowed money – to take them into 
voluntary receivership. This protected rail systems from dismemberment whilst 
their managers negotiated with their creditors. Success in reducing the fixed 
interest charges in this way allowed the railway promoters to emerge from 
bankruptcy with the cost of servicing their vast fixed term debts sufficiently 
reduced so that they could profitably renew their operations. Building from the 
legal cases concerning railway systems, via federal law on bankruptcy and 
subsequent amendments, access for managers to voluntary receivership was 
extended from ‘railways, utilities, and banks to a full range of industrial 
corporations’ (op. cit., p58). In this process, the corporation was defined as ‘a 
natural entity with a personality of its own, whose life plan was best devised by 
management’ (op. cit., p.51). This ‘natural entity’ of corporate liberal theory not 
only successfully fended off the challengers of creditors in receivership; it also 
rebuffed the claims of the state in regulation. Thus, rather than being a 
consequence of economic development in which markets are formative, the 
large scale of American capitalism is a product of judicial and political 
decision-making in which corporate liberal ideology was deployed by the 
representatives of corporate managers to persuade law-makers that the 
organisations  they controlled were natural entities.  
 
Subsequently, the hallmark of American capitalism has become the separation 
of control by managers from ownership by a large number of widely dispersed 
shareholders. An important factor encouraging external share-holding was the 
settlement between debtors and creditors emerging from voluntary 
receiverships, the origins of which are outlined above. The objective of 
corporate managers in avoiding bankruptcy and company dismemberment was 
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to reduce fixed charges to the level affordable in the deepest recession. 
Specialists in these forms of reorganisation pioneered methods of corporate 
recapitalisation which improved financial viability. A leader in this respect was 
the merchant banker, J.P. Morgan, who popularized the exchange of fixed term 
bonds for liabilities, the return on which was contingent on profitability – 
especially equity.8 ‘By exchanging obligations fixed by law for those payable at 
the discretion of management, reorganizers ensured that for the foreseeable 
future corporate integrity would no longer be threatened by the trade cycle’. 
(Berk, op. cit., pps 65-67).  
 
b. Shareholder capitalisation and the stock exchange as a market for 
corporate control 
The preference for equities in corporate funding diluted managerial control and 
contributed to the growing importance of joint stock corporate governance. 
Although the joint stock company had been in existence since the early 17th 
century, it was not until the introduction of ‘limited liability’ for investors 
during the mid-19th century that the joint stock company moved from the 
margins to the mainstream of corporate organizational forms. The separation of 
risk bearing (by investors) and management (by salaried employees) was 
considered to be an efficient division of labour.  Those with wealth could 
employ it productively while those who could manage were able to secure 
investment capital and other productive resources in the stock market.  The 
ability to diversify investment interests reduces risk and makes investment more 
attractive and more efficient.  In this model, shareholders collectively bear most 
of the risk of business failure, in exchange for which they are assigned residual 
income as the reward for success. Shareholder risk was reduced, however, as 
the separation of ownership from control impacted US law, ultimately leading 
to the creation of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an 
institution created to legally protect the interests of the shareholders of 
companies whose shares were traded in the American stock market.  In Britain, 
corporate law similarly came to prioritized shareholder interests.  
 
By the 1960s, when the Keynesian boom was at its height, the caution produced 
by the 1929 Stock Market Crash was replaced by confidence and a willingness 
to take risks, particularly if those risks could be transferred to others.  Investors 
began to realize the potential power of external shareholders in large family-
owned companies whose shares were traded on the stock market.  One such 
investor was James Slater, who, with Peter Walker, formed Slater Walker 
Securities in 1964 and launched the first hostile takeover in the UK (BBC 1999, 
Part 2).  Slater Walker, which grew to be a major financial and industrial 
conglomerate by the end of the decade, was an important player in the wave of 
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hostile takeovers in the UK during the 1960s and 1970s that served to 
reorganize British industry while at the same time fuelling the stock market 
boom. During the 1980s in the United States, a very similar movement took 
place with the loosening of regulations with respect to takeovers and with the 
development of a very active market in ‘high yield’ or ‘junk’ bonds.  Some of 
these financial instruments were used to fund takeovers which were followed by 
the hollowing-out of productive infrastructures as assets were sold to repay the 
debts incurred; and enormous profits were made by the individuals and 
organizations that conducted such transactions.  According to Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000), ‘these takeovers also placed managers in control of these 
corporations, who were predisposed towards shedding labour and selling off 
physical assets if that was what was needed to meet the corporation’s new 
financial obligations and, indeed, to push up the market value of the company’s 
stock.’ (p. 18) 
 
The mounting of takeover bids in both the US and Britain was facilitated by 
legal and accounting changes following the financial crisis of the 1930s and the 
resulting increase in transparency (Deakin and Singh, 2008).  In the US, the 
position of managers in companies threatened by takeover was further 
prejudiced by enactment of the 1968 Williams Act, which weakened the 
defences they could put into place.   During the same year, the City Code on 
Takeovers was introduced in London, to strengthen the relative position of 
shareholders. The City Code insisted that all shareholders should be given equal 
treatment when a company was taken over. In this, the acquirers of shares in the 
market were required to extend their offer to all of the target company’s 
shareholders; and limits were placed on the defensive actions that companies 
could take when singled out for acquisition. Although the City Code did not 
have statutory backing, it was effectively enforced by the ability of the financial 
and legal professions and financial trade associations based in the City of 
London, who were instrumental in setting up the Code, to bar those in breach of 
the regulations from practising (Deakin and Singh, 2008). 
 
The response of neo-classical theorists to the rapid growth in the number of 
hostile takeovers during this period was to declare the stock exchange to be an 
‘efficient market’ for managerial control The stock market was theorized to 
resolve the principle and agent problems between shareholders (assumed to be 
owners9 and hence principals) and their difficult to monitor agents, the 
managers. The argument goes that the dispersal of ownership amongst a 
multitude of shareholders impedes the effectiveness of monitoring and 
encourages inefficiency and/or opportunism amongst managers which reduces 
dividends and share prices. The stock market thus provides an opportunity to 
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punish wayward managers by allowing alternative managers, whose greater 
efficiency and reliability promises higher returns, to put in a stock market bid 
for a company’s shares that is higher than the current market valuation. The 
theoretical advantage of stock market monitoring of managers is that, unlike 
other stakeholders, the only interest shareholders have in the business is current, 
and expected future, residual income (i.e. the income that remains when other 
stakeholders have been paid off), which supposedly determines the price of 
ordinary shares.  Therefore, hostile takeovers provide evidence that the stock 
market operates as an efficient market for corporate control by providing an 
effective mechanism for monitoring and disciplining managers, which 
shareholders are uniquely placed to trigger (Deakin and Slinger, 1997).  
 
It follows from the notion that the stock market operates as an efficient market 
for corporate control that the prices it delivers (ie. the value of a company’s 
shares) reflect the value of the underlying productive enterprise.  From this 
perspective, the stock market boom was taken as evidence of overall industrial 
strength. In turn, the short-term increase in share prices resulting from cost 
cutting and massive layoffs in companies that had been taken-over served to 
reinforce the theory’s assumptions.  However, this ignored the reality that a 
significant proportion of the ‘profits’ generated by hostile takeovers were 
derived from asset stripping, as opposed to restructuring that had enhanced 
sustainable  output and productivity in the organizations involved (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000). The hostile takeover was considered an effective and 
efficient means by which under-performing management teams could be 
replaced by more effective ones, with a predicted beneficial impact on the 
longer-term performance of the companies concerned (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997).  As a result, the stock market boom encouraged a shift in government 
policy in favour of hostile takeovers as the conglomerate movement gathered 
pace in the US and in the UK.  This flew in the face of the results of careful 
research which showed that the long term effect of takeovers was detrimental to 
corporate performance.10 
 
From the 1960s, the growth in the proportion of the population exposed in the 
stock market by virtue of their pension, retirement, insurance and savings funds 
invested there gave shareholder value increased credibility.  At the same time, 
the emergence of large institutional investors managing these funds gave 
shareholders an increasing ‘voice’ in the management of firms whose shares 
were held in these funds were managed.  During the 1980s, the rise of hostile 
takeovers, leveraged with borrowed money repaid by the sale of productive 
assets, secured enormous profit for their perpetrators. But it laid waste swathes 
of the productive economy at substantial cost to other stakeholders, including 
 17 
 
workers whose invested pension contributions had made them unknowing 
shareholders11. So the response of institutional investors produced a counter-
reaction that strengthened the power and centrality of shareholders, particularly 
in America. 
  
During the second part of the 1980s, the revelation of corruption in the 
American banking system led to panic and stock market collapse. During the 
1990s, encouraged by the pension funds and the ‘myth’ of the beneficial 
‘disciplining’ role of the hostile takeover, corporate governance again came to the 
fore as an issue both for public policy and management practice.  The idea the 
shareholders were ‘principles’ to whom managers were ‘agents’ gained ground. 
This was manifested in the implementation of external forms of governance, 
including the proliferation of corporate governance codes strengthening the 
position of shareholders and enhancing their protection.  It was supported by the 
widespread adoption of executive share option schemes and other forms of 
managerial remuneration designed to more closely align the interests, and 
especially the financial objectives, of shareholders and top management.  During 
this period, industry was radically restructured through the operation of the market 
for corporate control (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001); and in the process, long 
established mechanisms for the exercise of voice by non-shareholder interests – 
above all, employee representation in its various forms – were marginalized.   
 
Paradoxically, the growing polarization of shareholder and workforce interests 
was accompanied by development in both the US and the UK of innovative forms 
of labour-management relations designed to capture the benefits of co-operation 
among corporate stakeholders.  The background to this was rapid technological 
change and intensifying competition in product markets, brought about by 
globalization and, particularly in the UK, privatization.  Customers learned to 
exercise their choice more aggressively and shareholders became increasingly 
impatient for a quick and profitable return on their investments. In response to 
these pressures, firms were forced to re-examine their internal governance and 
organizational systems and structures in an effort to improve performance 
(Burchell et al, 2002).  Although downsizing and business process re-engineering 
were part of the response, labour-management ‘partnerships’ were also initiated, 
often in the very same companies that had undergone substantial restructuring.  
These arrangements led to innovations in the employment relationship, including 
a significant degree of self-management and autonomy for employees.   
 
Thus, as a means of enhancing the firm’s competitiveness, and hence its long term 
prospects, the internal governance of organizations is required to foster a higher 
degree of co-operation between management, the workforce, customers, suppliers 
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and, increasingly, the natural and social environment.   Concurrently, stock market 
pressure requires, if necessary, the sacrifice of any or all of these mutually 
beneficial long-term interests to the short-term pecuniary benefits of shareholders.    
 
3.  Globalization and Effective Regulation 
The globalization of capital, product and labour markets has served to intensify 
these contradictory pressures, particularly in the absence of effective regulation, 
much of which was abandoned in the interest of freeing up the market.   
 
During the post war period in the United States and in the wake of the Great 
Depression, there was recognition in the US of the need for national-level 
regulations to protect the interests of workers, the environment and consumers. 
With expansion of the internal-American market, corporations grew to become 
increasingly national in scope; and their enormous political and economic 
strength expanded beyond the capabilities of individual states to constrain.  
During this period, as was shown above, the liberal response to market failure 
was the ‘New Deal,’ through which organized labour worked together with 
national government to protect the public interest in long-term economic and 
social welfare creation and to counter-balance the power of large corporations.  
This not only served to strengthen the American labour movement; it also 
produced national welfare provisions that raised and protected labour standards 
while at the same time improving access to such public goods as health care and 
security in retirement, many of these social benefits being provided by 
employers.  
 
In Europe, the creation of the European Union (EU) was a similar response to 
expansion of markets and of corporate productive systems; and this led to an as 
yet unresolved debate  about the need to synchronise economic and social 
standards to create the level playing field required for effective economic 
integration.  During the 1990s, the growing internationalization of business 
widened the debate about the potentially destructive consequences of 
international trade for labour standards within the EU (Wilkinson 1994; 
Sengenberger and Wilkinson 1995).  This debate revolved around the 
possibility that unregulated markets might precipitate a ‘race to the bottom,’ in 
which lower labour standards in the developing world would drive down 
standards in the developed nations of which the EU formed a part.  The result 
was the strengthening of internationally enforceable standards within the EU, 
which with expansion, have been, or will be after an agreed transition period, 
extended to all member states. 
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Undoubtedly, the increasing globalization of markets for products, labour and 
capital has contributed to economic growth in many developing countries; and it 
has generated benefits for consumers in advanced economies in the form of low 
price goods and services.  But these short-term advantages may have been 
gained at heavy long term costs.  By lowering standards in the developed world, 
they effectively lower the floor that developing countries can hope to one day 
achieve.  And whilst the availability of low price goods and services produced 
in the developing world has helped to reduce the daily cost of living for 
households in importing countries, the effect of globalization has been to 
undermine the position of immobile factors of production, especially labour, at 
risk from low cost imports. One effect of this impoverisation is an erosion of the 
domestic demand base. To a degree, this was offset,  (or delayed, as now seems 
more likely) by the availability of cheap credit, lower taxes and reductions in 
savings used to fund current consumption which have buffered the immediate 
effects on vulnerable groups (Silvers 2007).  But in the longer-term, credit 
based spending higher than that warranted by disposable income has tempted 
many poor households into debt-induced poverty. This is threatening living 
standards in a growing proportion of the population and contributing to the 
current ‘credit crunch’ as banks and other financial institutions have cut 
borrowing with upward revisions of standards of credit worthiness and with the 
reclassification of many existing borrowers as credit risks.  
 
The absence of a governance framework for global financial regulation allowed 
fraudulent activities to proliferate, serving to undermine confidence in capital 
markets, especially the New York and London stock exchanges.  The increasing 
globalization of equity holders means, further, that returns to equity will 
increasingly flow abroad, with a potentially de-stabilizing effect on the foreign 
exchanges.  Strine (2007b: 36) concludes that ‘the ability of any nation … to 
address these emerging circumstances in isolation is … minimal.’  Just as co-
operation is essential to the long-term effectiveness of the corporate ‘productive 
system,’ so it is for the broader socio-economic system of which the corporation 
forms a part (Wilkinson 1994; 1998).  Thus, it is imperative that organizations 
and nations co-operate in developing a global institutional framework that 
extends to developing countries the corporate governance and financial market 
regulations that have already proven effective in protecting social and economic 
standards.  This need has been underlined by the unfolding of the current crisis. 
 
4.  The Genesis of the Current Crisis: High Yield Risk Assessment and 
Securitization   
Much of the blame for the current financial crisis can be laid at the door of 
apparently new financial innovations, such as the Collateralized Debt 
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Obligation (CDO), other high yield instruments and flawed models of valuation 
and risk assessment.  However, these financial instruments – and an unreliable 
system of risk measurement – have a much longer history and a legacy of 
financial damage that goes back considerably further than the most recent 
‘credit crunch.’ 
 
In the United States, deteriorating economic conditions during the 1970s set into 
motion a series of events that would ultimately give rise to both the high yield 
‘junk’ bond market and the first collateralised debt obligations (CDOs).  In 
1971, the disintegration of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system and 
increasing inflationary pressures pushed up interest rates.  By the middle of the 
decade, almost thirty years of interest rate stability had been reversed and short-
term borrowing costs had substantially increased.  A recession and two oil 
crises precipitated a stock market slump that reduced the market value of 
American corporations by almost half.  Banks stopped lending to all but the 
highest-rated companies; and as yields in the open market rose above the 
interest-rate caps on bank deposits that had been set by the Fed, money flowed 
out of the banking system and into the money markets where higher yields 
could be found.  Only the most financially secure borrowers were able to obtain 
credit and many innovative companies with high rates of return on capital and 
rapid rates of growth were unable to access capital.  This environment produced 
two significant outcomes: rapid expansion of the ‘high yield’ bond market and 
the use of the CDO as a tool for enabling growth in the Savings and Loans 
(S&L) sector.  
 
a. The High Yield (‘Junk’) bond market 
Although popularly attributed to Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert 
(DLB) during the 1980s, the ‘high yield bond’ had been in existence long 
before.  High yield bonds were used by the United States of America, soon after 
the country’s founding in the 1780s (Yago 1991), and were extensively used 
after the civil war to build railways and consolidate their ownership.  They were 
also used by companies in newly emerging industries – including General 
Motors, US Steel and IBM – to raise development funds during the first part of 
the twentieth century.  Indeed, during the 1980s, a considerable proportion of 
the capital raised by these financial instruments was put to much the same use 
during what would ultimately come to be known as the ‘junk bond’ era (Scott 
2000: 6).   
 
There is nothing inherently dubious about a high yield bond; and the term ‘junk’ 
was to a large extent coined retrospectively to indicate a less than investment 
grade product.  Higher levels of return are often associated with higher levels of 
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risk; and start-up or development capital is very likely to be more risky than 
government debt, such as US Treasury Bonds.  In the US, many new businesses 
in recent times, including the cable television industry, were significantly 
enabled by high yield bonds, adding both vigour and new jobs to these segments 
of the economy.  It is also worth noting that the high yield bond continues to be 
a significant source of capital and remains a viable option for many new, 
developing or struggling companies.   But high yield bonds were also used for 
more speculative purposes.  
 
Using the high yield bond, Milken was instrumental in creating a spectacularly 
dynamic market for these financial products during the 1980s.  Whilst a 
considerable proportion of the funds raised were used to finance development 
investments, large sums also found their way into leveraged buy outs that 
resulted in dismemberment and asset stripping of the target corporations, a 
practice exported from the UK, along with one of its greatest proponents, James 
Goldsmith.  In the process, large segments of America’s traditional 
manufacturing and productive industries were ‘hollowed out,’ with devastating 
effects on the employees and local communities (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000). 
 
Because of the attractive returns on offer, corporate raiders who specialised in 
asset stripping to boost short term yields (giving the illusion of improved 
productivity in the process) found willing allies in pension fund managers, 
many of whom had a legal obligation to maximise returns for pensioners.  But 
the negative effects of mass redundancies on employees ability to contribute to 
pension funds, and hence their long term viability, was ignored by pension fund 
managers. As a consequence, the end of the corporate raiders did not spell the 
end of the process they had begun.  Rather, managers of pension and investment 
funds that already owned a majority share holding in remaining corporations 
learned that they could continue to generate substantial returns to short term 
‘shareholder value’ without hostile takeovers (BBC 1999, part 3). 
 
One of the problems inherent to high yield bonds is that their use in acquiring 
other financial assets multiplies the number of securities involved and 
complicates the interdependency of their performance. This makes the valuation 
of assets, and quantification of the underlying risk, much more difficult than 
tracking a small number of easily identifiable securities with a known track 
record. Consequently, costliness of using traditional methods of asset valuation 
and risk analysis provided strong incentives to find an alternative approach.  In 
response, Drexel Burnham Lambert developed a formula-based approach of the 
kind that Keynes had held to be unworkable as a means of predicting future 
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events, and a technique that has subsequently played a significant role in the 
current financial market crisis and has been much criticised for underestimating 
the risk in assets underpinning CDOs.  The undervaluation of risk in DBL’s 
models was one of the factors that eventually caused the bank’s collapse in 
1990 (Eichenwald 1990). 
 
Not only are there the more obvious difficulties associated with formula-based 
valuation systems that rely on potentially dangerous generalisations and 
assumptions and can be impenetrable to the non specialist, sometimes including 
the organisation’s own senior management.  Higher risk assets tend to be 
amongst the first casualties during an economic downturn.  This is especially 
the case when they are linked to an industry notorious for bubbles – like real 
estate and, particularly, housing. 
 
b. The American Savings & Loans (S&L) crisis 
The S&L crisis of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s had its roots in very similar 
conditions to those that ignited growth in the high yield bond market during the 
1980s.  S&Ls or ‘thrifts’ had been created during the 1800s as community-
based institutions for savings and mortgages in the United States.  Tight 
regulation at both the state and federal levels, included restrictions on the range 
of loans that could be made and ceilings on interest rates that could be offered 
to depositors.  During the 1970s, in response to wide fluctuations in interest 
rates, money flowed out of S&Ls in search of higher yields, thereby starving the 
sector of funds to issue new mortgages and severely restricting growth.   
 
One solution came from Drexel Burnham Lambert in the form of the 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO), in which loans were bundled together and 
sold on the securities market as investment products.  The CDO allowed the 
issuer to remove these assets from its balance sheet while at the same time 
providing cash with which to make additional loans.  It also resulted in a 
significant increase in leverage, which turned out to be particularly dangerous 
for three main reasons that, in the context of the current financial crisis, are 
eerily familiar.  First, the assets were valued by mathematical formulae, with the 
same scope for inaccurate risk assessment and valuation as had undermined the 
credibility of the high yield bonds during the 1980s.  Second, the model 
depended on a continually rising or, at the very least, stable, housing market to 
survive.  If the market turned downward, the system of payments would be 
threatened, with potentially fatal effect to the underlying investment.  Third, 
since S&Ls were also known as ‘thrift’ institutions, it is not hard to surmise that 
their CDOs might well have included a significant percentage of what would 
now be classified as ‘sub prime’ mortgages. 
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In response to the banking sector’s difficulties, a series of legislative reforms 
were enacted.  In 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (DIDMCA) eliminated many of the distinctions among different 
types of depository institutions and removed the interest rate cap on deposit 
accounts.  At the same time, federal S&Ls were given expanded authority to 
make acquisition, development and construction (ADC) loans and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance limit on individual accounts was increased from $40,000 to 
$100,000.  In the case of struggling S&Ls, increasing Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) coverage permitted managers to take greater 
risk in trying to work their way out of insolvency in the expectation that the 
government might avoid having to takeover a failed institution.  During the 
same year, the federal Home Loan Board removed the limit on brokered 
deposits that an S&L was permitted to hold and reduced the net worth 
requirement for insured S&Ls from 5 to 4 percent of total deposits, lowering it 
again, to 3 percent, in 1982.  
 
The Tax Reform Act of 1981 provided powerful tax incentives for real estate 
investment by individuals, spurring a boom in the real estate market and 
contributing to over-construction.  During the early 1980s, this combined with 
lower interest rates and legislation under the Reagan Administration, designed 
to make S&Ls more competitive, spurred growth in the sector.  The Garn-St. 
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 allowed federal S&Ls to diversify 
their activities with the view of increasing profits, including ownership of 
projects that had been funded by their loans.  This encouraged a massive 
defection from state chartered to federally chartered S&Ls. 
 
Despite these changes, the American S&L industry experienced record losses 
during the 1980s.  Over a thousand thrift institutions failed in what has been 
identified as ‘the greatest collapse of US financial institutions since the Great 
Depression’ (Curry and Shibut 2000: 33).  As the total cost of these failures 
exceeded the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)’s 
ability to pay insured depositors, US taxpayers and the industry were required to 
contribute to the insurance coverage at a total cost of approximately $153 
billion (Curry and Shibut 2000: 33). 
 
Although the S&L crisis was in many ways precipitated by international factors 
– and many of the factors and processes at work bear comparison to the current 
crisis – there is also an important difference.  The limitation of the main effects 
of the S&L crisis to a single sector of the American banking industry, whose 
survival was not considered critical to confidence in, and the health of, the 
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national or global financial system meant that it could be allowed to fail.  When 
the S&L crisis was finally resolved, the number of federally insured S&Ls had 
been reduced by nearly half, from 3,234 in 1986 to 1,645 in 1995 at a cost of 
approximately $124 billion to the American taxpayer (Curry and Shibut 2000: 
26).  Along the way, Drexel Burnham Lambert had also disappeared.  However, 
once again, like the high yield bond and the formula-based assessment of risk, 
the CDO survived the crisis. 
 
In a 1996 address, delivered in Tokyo, Japan, L. William Seidman, former 
Chairman of the FDIC and Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) said that during 
the 1980s and 1990s, the US had experienced ‘a banking and S&L and credit 
union problem of major proportions – clearly the worst difficulties since the 
Great Depression.’  He went on to say that ‘Given the extent of the problems, 
we in the US are ‘long’ on experience and if we don’t learn a lot from these 
experiences, we will surely repeat our problems.’ (Seidman 1997, Volume II, 
pp. 55-56)  It would appear that some of the lessons from the S&L Crisis have 
not yet been learned, and the problems were repeated. 
 
5.  The Anatomy of the Current Financial Market Crisis and its Location in 
Socio-economic History 
In the General Theory, Keynes argued that financial markets, where money is 
demanded for both productive and speculative uses, operate on relatively short-
term time horizons (Keynes 1936, Ch. 12).  Markets for finance adjust very 
quickly and are prone to swings of ‘spontaneous’ optimism and pessimism 
during which individuals, unsure of their own ability to predict the future, 
follow the lead of others, creating a sort of ‘herd’ mentality.  As a result, 
financial market instability is exaggerated by the psychological tendency to 
believe that periods of prosperity (or of collapse) will continue without 
interruption; and the system is ‘shocked’ when this proves not to be the case.  
This volatility of money markets feeds into real decision-making by its affects 
on the rate of interest and on business confidence.  
 
Building on Keynes, Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis suggests that 
during extended periods of economic prosperity, capitalist financial systems 
develop fragilities that expose the macro-economy to the possibility of Fisher-
type debt-deflations (Minsky 1985; 1992).  In this scenario, the apparent 
unlimited availability of credit and investment opportunities creates over-
indebtedness.  Eventually, a process of debt liquidation is precipitated, 
contributing to deflation as assets are sold off at prices lower than their purchase 
price, money deposits are drawn down and the velocity of circulation slows.  
Deflation reduces net worth of businesses and profits, causing a decline in 
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output, trade and employment.  Fear leads to hoarding and a reluctance to 
borrow slowing further the velocity of circulation.  Together, these forces exert 
downward pressure on nominal or money interest rates, but an upward pressure 
on real or commodity rates of interest as prices fall. 
 
Following the Minsky logic, the current global financial malaise is first and 
foremost a crisis of liquidity – once excessive and now insufficient. The period 
1990 – 2005 has been described as the ‘great moderation’, characterized by low 
and stable global inflation, high and steady global GDP growth, declining levels 
of real interest rates and increasing deregulation; especially after the bursting of 
the so-called technological bubble at the end of 2000 when Greenspan famously 
saved the show by cutting interest rates. One crucial development has been the 
rapid growth in the world’s propensity to save, caused importantly by the 
redistribution of world wealth and income to high savers. Determinants of this 
include accelerated economic growth in China, led by burgeoning foreign trade 
in manufactures; high saving rates in Japan and growing wealth in Saudi 
Arabia, Norway and other oil rich countries as oil prices have risen. By 2006, 
global foreign exchange reserves were growing at a 15 percent annualized rate, 
translating into $600 billion in central bank funds looking to invest in 
government bonds12.  At the same time, increasing pension provision 
requirements for the ageing Western and Japanese populations hurled another 
wave of money against financial assets, exerting further downward pressure on 
returns.  This process was accelerated by the desire in Europe to transition from 
a pay-as-you-go, tax-funded pension structure to a provisioned, privately-
funded model.  Company pension plans also had to seek higher yields to offset 
the impact of falling rates.  The combined effect was an unending drive for 
yield and a willingness to consider both more risky investments (e.g. junk) and 
new and unconventional vehicles to deliver it. 
 
During the first part of the new millennium, the US Federal Reserve’s (Fed’s) 
attempt to counter both the deflation of the technology bubble and the impact of 
9/11 using a sustained monetary stimulus added to the appetite for borrowing.  
But lower interest rates made it increasingly difficult for investors and financial 
intermediaries to earn adequate yields from traditional debt investments.  
However, not only did banks need to search for higher returns.  Mindful of the 
Basel Accord, they had to achieve this without increasing requirements for 
expensive regulatory capital.  A solution was found by moving from an initiate-
to-hold to an initiate-to-distribute banking model.  Rather than keep assets on 
the balance sheet and post regulatory capital against them, banks instead 
packaged those assets and distributed them to other investors, booking gain-on-
sale income and obviating the need to hold additional capital.  This both made 
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use of and made acceptable new financial innovations and technologies in 
‘securitization’ and derivatives. 
 
Securitization, the packaging of multiple loans into new securities which service 
interest and principal from the cash flows of those loans, is not in itself new.  
The creation of Fannie Mae as part of the New Deal promoted the securitization 
of residential mortgages, while credit cards, student loans and auto loans also 
have an extensive history of securitization in the US (see above).  What 
differentiates the growth in securitized products over the last decade is the 
inclusion of securities with little performance history, such as new US mortgage 
markets, non-US mortgages, emerging market credit and ultimately, other 
securitizations.  In addition, the complexity of their structure frequently made 
the instruments impossible to accurately value, once liquidity began to 
deteriorate.  These products are known by a variety of names, such as 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and collateralized loan obligations 
(CLOs), depending on the underlying instruments.  Further explanation is 
provided in Appendix I. 
 
Global investment banks sold CDOs and CLOs throughout the world, but 
investors often lacked an intimate knowledge of the assets that populated them.  
This increased the difficulty of analyzing the underlying securities, intensifying 
investors’ reliance on the credit rating agencies (CRAs).  However, the rating 
agencies were not immune to the drive for yield, either.  As corporations de-
leveraged after 2002, the rating agencies’ were motivated to look for alternative 
sources of revenue.  In this, new structured products offered promise not merely 
in terms of the volume of new issues but also because the agencies believed that 
the ratings for these investments could be derived from statistical models, 
thereby reducing the perceived need for expensive qualitative analysis.   
 
Another factor in the exponential growth of securitized products was the 
development of the credit default swap (CDS) market.  CDS’s are effectively 
insurance contracts that enable the ‘protection buyer’ to insure a certain amount 
of bond principal against default in return for an annual premium. The CDS 
market grew rapidly in response to the dual effect of the regulators’ decision to 
allow banks to reduce capital requirements against risk positions by ‘buying 
protection’ and the standardization of documentation and default procedures.  
As a result, the CDS could be used not only as bond insurance, but also as a 
stand-alone expression of credit risk.  By buying a CDS, an investor could take 
a ‘short’ position in the underlying credit, believing that the CDS premium 
would increase or ‘widen’ as the credit deteriorated and enabling the buyer to 
sell protection to ‘cover’ his position at a profit.  Conversely, a CDS seller 
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would generate a ‘long’ position or own the risk of the underlying credit.  If the 
credit improved, the CDS premium would decrease or ‘tighten’, enabling the 
seller to take profit by buying protection with a tighter spread.  
 
Although the same effect could be achieved with bonds, the dominant factor in 
the price of a bond is usually the interest rate risk, making it difficult to take a 
‘pure’ view on the underlying credit.  Further, the ability to take ‘long’ or 
‘short’ positions in a bond is limited by the availability of the bond issue, 
whereas CDS’s are far more liquid.  It was these factors, combined with the lack 
of complication of the cash component of bonds that encouraged the packaging 
of CDS into ‘synthetic’ CDOs, in which the underlying assets were CDS 
contracts.  This gave another huge boost to the development of the CDS market, 
which currently exceeds $30trn globally. 
 
The burgeoning structured credit market caused a cycle of ever-declining credit 
costs.  When a CDO was launched, the manager would have either to buy bonds 
in the open market with which to populate it (if cash) or sell protection on the 
underlying credits (if synthetic).  The effect was to unleash a wave of demand 
which would cause those credits selected for the CDO to tighten – the so-called 
‘structured bid’.  Since credit traders could arbitrage any differences between 
cash and synthetic markets, tightening in one would also cause the other to 
tighten.  The effect of the structured bid was to make traditional, single-name 
credits even less attractive from a yield perspective, encouraging further 
investment in structured products.  As yields in these products also decreased, 
investors were driven towards either structured securities with riskier 
underlying assets or to increasingly esoteric structures.  The overall effect of the 
proliferation of these new financial instruments was not merely to drive down 
credit costs but to reduce the price differential between high-grade and riskier 
credit.   
 
Developments in structured debt markets underlie much of the current ‘credit 
crunch.’  For example, the growth in sub prime mortgages and ‘self-certification 
mortgages’ would have been unthinkable without the vast network of structured 
products that could rapidly repackage the risk in apparently sanitized, 
collateralized form.  Much of this risk could then be exported far away from the 
banks and brokers who originated it, to investors who could not examine the 
underlying loans but instead relied on the rating agencies.  Any misgivings were 
overcome by the promise of yield; but this was a market where the payment for 
credit risk was being consistently eroded. 
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The boom in the structured credit market also fostered the leveraged buyout 
(LBO) boom of 2005-2006.  In this, the loans made by banks to facilitate LBOs 
could be included in CLOs because the structured credit investors were so 
hungry for yield.  Again, globalized investment banking ensured that CLOs 
were sold to investors far removed both geographically and in understanding 
from the companies to which the underlying loans were made. Since LBO debt 
financing was cheap, it was relatively easy to construct deals exceeding internal 
rates of return of 15 percent; and as a corollary, easy liquidity conditions 
ensured that the LBO funds that provided the equity stubs were themselves 
flush with cash. 
 
So plentiful were the financing opportunities provided by the structured credit 
market that the companies subject to LBO were far from the traditional slackly 
managed, asset-rich, under-leveraged, under-performing mature company that 
generated ample cash flows.  In April 2007, for example, buyout firm J. C. 
Flowers, in concert with Bank of America and J.P. Morgan attempted a 
leveraged buyout of student loan finance company, SLM Corp.  Between 
September 2000 and April 2007 SLM’s stock had outperformed the S&P by 242 
percent and the S&P 500 Financials by 152 percent13.  Moreover, as a finance 
company, SLM was already highly leveraged, with equity equal to 
approximately 3 percent of managed assets.   
 
However, just as the structured credit market exerted a multiplier effect when 
liquidity was plentiful, when some of the weaker assets began to default – a 
process that began in the US sub prime mortgage market in early 2007 – it 
exerted a similar but negative effect.  Structured credit had spread risk across a 
broader base of investors; but these new investors proved far more jittery and 
fickle than traditional investors when things went sour.  With an increase in 
defaults on the underlying assets of structured credit products, the rating 
agencies began to downgrade structured securities.  This triggered panic among 
investors who had to unwind the structures.  As a result, spreads widened 
dramatically and liquidity dried up.  In the mortgage market, this dampened the 
desire of banks to refinance sub prime mortgages or option adjustable-rate 
mortgages that were coming up to an interest rate reset.  And as demand 
evaporated, they began to book significant mark-to-market losses on the 
securitizations that were ‘held for sale’ on their balance sheets. 
 
LBOs also came to a halt as US banks were left in the third quarter of 2007 with 
$350bn of LBO loans/lending commitments that they unable to unload as the 
CLO market seized up.  The attempted LBO of SLM was one of the victims.  In 
this case, when equity investors realized that increased debt costs would prevent 
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them from reaching internal rate of return hurdles on the transaction, they used 
minor legislative changes in student loan subsidies to call a ‘Material Adverse 
Event’ and withdraw.  A subsequent share price offer of $50 rather than $60 
was rejected and the deal fell apart. 
 
The de-leveraging that began in 2007 has increased in pace and, partly as a 
result of the global nature of investment, its impact has been exported around 
the world.  So badly have the banks been affected by collapsing valuations on 
structured securities that many have had to seek state support to avoid 
insolvency.  The cost of intervention in the US alone comes to well over $1trn. 
In terms of product markets, this will translate into, at best, a punitive re pricing 
of credit risk and, at worst, a freezing of credit that could precipitate a wave of 
insolvency among relatively healthy companies with refinancing risk.  The fall-
out is far from over.  To paraphrase Churchill, we are not at the end or even the 
beginning of the end; we might however, be at ‘the end of the beginning’ 
(Churchill 1942).  
 
6.  Conclusions: Co-evolution of nascent conventional wisdom and crisis in 
the old 
The natural starting point for our conclusions is a return to the Galbraithian 
vision of the ‘conventional wisdom’ in economics, which at any point in time is 
inherently conservative and gives way not to new ideas but to circumstances it 
cannot explain. In this process, the gathering forces of change nurture the ideas 
that come to constitute the revised conventional wisdom. The period we have 
chosen, 1919 to the present, can usefully be divided into three of what might be 
described as ‘Galbraithian episodes’: (1) the end of the First World War through 
the end of World War II; (2) the end of the Second World War through the end 
of the 1970s; and (3) the late 1970s to the present.   
 
During the first of these episodes, the conventional economic wisdom was 
laissez faire - until circumstances ushered in a belief that the government could 
usefully intervene to stimulate the economy. In the US, the 1920s experienced 
what Arndt (1944) described as an ‘astonishing boom’ (p. 15) which was 
unprecedented, if unequally distributed. Prosperity was characterised by a 
revolution in industrial techniques and organisation and rapid progress in new 
industries, especially motor cars and consumer durables.  Early in 1929, 
however, growth in the US economy slowed and later in the year, the stock 
market crash exacerbated the downturn. By 1933, wholesale prices had fallen 
by 30 percent and industrial production and employment were down by 54 
percent and 25 percent, respectively. The spring of 1933 also saw a financial 
crisis and the collapse of a number of banks. In response, the Roosevelt 
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administration’s New Deal represented the most comprehensive recovery 
package initiative by any democratic government. However, the US economy 
was less than fully responsive; and it was not until the additional boost to 
manufacturing created by the Second World War that the US economy fully 
recovered.    
 
By contrast, the UK economy followed a different path and remained in the 
‘doldrums’ throughout the 1920s as the Treasury followed a restrictive 
monetary policy in support of restoration of the Gold Standard at its 1914 
parity.  In 1931, however, a cut in interest rates, originally designed to reduce 
the burden of debt from the First World War, triggered a house building and 
consumer durables boom, which in 1937 was extended by re-armament.   
 
Thus, in both the US and the UK, following the Depression, the government 
assumed a role in stabilizing the business cycle by fine tuning demand. But with 
the rise of neo-liberalism, the focus of theory and policy shifted to the monetary 
causes of inflation and the efficiency and welfare benefits of free markets. This 
involved a reversion to the pre-Keynesian view that rather than being a systemic 
problem, the responsibility for unemployment and poverty lies with the jobless 
and the poor.  Since 1979, macro-economic policy has been dominated by 
attempts to control inflation by monetary means whilst responsibility for 
increasing employment has been delegated to market forces. Trade unions have 
been weakened, legal control of labour standards relaxed, out-of-work benefits 
reduced and subject to more onerous conditions; and wage subsidisation has 
been introduced with the express purpose of lowering NAIRU and generating 
higher levels of employment. Concurrently, markets and business have been 
deregulated; all restrictions on the money supply have been lifted; large sections 
of the public sector have been privatised; and taxes on the rich have been cut to 
encourage enterprise.  In this new world of carrots and sticks, the carrot has 
been offered to those with the advantage while the stick has been progressively 
applied to the disadvantaged.  
 
As with macro-economics, there has been a parallel progression in theory and 
policy with respect to industrial organisation and corporate governance.  When 
industry was mainly small-scale, the theory and policy presumptions were that 
industrial concentration was in restraint of trade and as a consequence in 
opposition to the public interest. But as the scale of industry increased, the 
conventional wisdom evolved to contend that large firms had a comparative 
advantage in terms of fostering innovation in production and marketing. With 
developments in the stock market – in particular, the initiation and diffusion of 
hostile company acquisitions – theory lent force to the notion that the stock 
 31 
 
market serves as an efficient market for corporate control that monitors 
potentially malfeasant managers (the ‘agents’) on behalf of shareholder 
‘owners’ (the ‘principals’); this is despite the fact that in legal reality, their 
ownership status has no foundation (Deakin, 2005).  By this reasoning, the 
share price is interpreted as measuring the value of the company as an economic 
entity and in so doing links the worlds of production and finance.  
 
From the 1970s, with the strengthening of the Anglo-American style 
‘shareholder model’ of corporate governance and as limitations on the money 
supply were lifted, inflation in the stock market was fuelled by managerial 
efforts to increase share prices by whatever means possible. Advantage was 
taken of deregulation and complicated institutional arrangements, such as 
special purpose entities, by which securitised financial assets were used to 
disguise debts and inflate the market prices of shares above their real values.  
But when the underlying reality was revealed, confidence evaporated, causing 
the collapse of stock market prices. This brought down the underlying 
productive organization, like Enron and others, at enormous cost to its 
stakeholders, and to the broader social and economic system in which these 
companies were embedded. 
 
Since then, financial market liberalization and the relaxation of regulation have 
greatly increased both the amount of finance available and the rate at which 
financial market innovations have outpaced the capacity to supervise and 
regulate.  Rapid development in information technology made possible both the 
creation of complex and often dubious financial instruments and their rapid 
distribution to under-informed investors around the globe; it also allowed global 
markets to react much more quickly. As a consequence, when confidence in 
CDOs and other such derivatives was shaken, their markets rapidly unravelled, 
at ruinous cost to many of the financial institutions involved. The knock-on 
effect was a freezing-up of liquidity, collapse of security prices and inability of 
financial institutions to put a value on their holdings.  As stock market prices 
fell, financing from the banking sector dried up and confidence disappeared. 
This rebounded on the non-financial productive system causing a collapse in 
effective demand as debt-laden consumers and others fearful of the future cut 
spending. In the UK, from the final quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 
2009 real GDP fell by 4.8 percent, employment fell by 465 thousand and 
unemployment increased by 833 thousand. 
 
Adding to these costs, the UK government’s rescue of the banks and the 
increase in social welfare expenditure and reduced taxation accompanying the 
recession have increased the national debt by an estimated £175 billion.  In 
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response, the current debate between the UK Tories and the Labour government 
is how this is to be re-couped over the next few years by cutting government 
expenditure. At the time of the bank bail-outs, the Labour government had 
sweetened the pill with forecasts that the public money involved would be 
recovered, perhaps with a small profit, when the banks in question were 
returned to the private sector. This has subsequently dropped off the political 
agenda while efforts at regulation have made little real progress so far. Given 
the significant relative contribution that the financial sector makes to the UK 
macro-economy, punitive regulation seems unlikely since both the UK 
government and the banks have a shared vested interest in a return to strong 
profit growth in the financial sector. As a result, the real cost of the banking 
bailout is to fall on the recipients of government expenditure and workers in the 
public sector. But it will not end there. The multiplier effects of this level of 
cuts in government expenditure will be substantial and long-lasting.   
 
In our view, subjecting the economy to this additional burden at a time when 
current indicators suggest that it is sinking deeper into recession is the 
inappropriate policy response. Moreover, the people being asked to make the 
sacrifice are in no way responsible for the mess that the economy is in.  The 
fault lies with the bankers, who have neither accepted responsibility nor given 
any indication that they are prepared to alter their business practices sufficiently 
radically to avoid a repetition of the financial market chaos of the past two 
years.  The more appropriate government response is to borrow the money 
required to combat recession, the cost of which would be relatively small 
because interest rates are so low. With respect to the portion of the debt 
generated by the bank bail-outs, actions should be taken to assure that these 
costs stand as a charge on the banking system.  Such a levy would have the 
additional advantage of mopping up excess liquidity to guard against the sector 
embarking on any such reckless gambling sprees in the future.   
 
Governance reform would, however, need to be congruent with the market. 
Both Wall Street and London’s Square Mile acquired and built their influence 
as a result of ‘light touch’ regulation – resulting in what is known in The City as 
the ‘Wimbledon Effect,’ a great British tradition, but almost all the players are 
foreign. Initially attracted by the lack of regulation, they would be likely to 
move on, should London tighten regulation independently. The same would also 
apply to New York or any other financial centre. Regulatory arbitrage thus 
necessitates a globally enforceable set of rules. The over-reliance of post 
industrial economies, such as Britain and America, on the financial sector 
underscores the imperative of such a system and the ineffectuality of 
independent national regulation.   
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Ironically, Britain is, as in 1919, once again grappling with enormous 
government debt. But this time, it has far fewer options to manage either the 
debt or the rest of the economy. 
 
 
 
Notes
 
1 The exception to this was agriculture which was in recession throughout the 
1920s  
2 For analysis of US policy in the inter-war years see especially Arndt (1944) 
and Laidler, (1999)  
3 Both Lauchlin Currie and Harry Dexter White became key policy advisors 
during the Roosevelt era. At the Federal Reserve Board and later at the Treasury 
and White House Currie became a leading advocate of expansionary fiscal 
policy, and White was a co-architect with Keynes of the Bretton Woods system 
(Laidler, 2002, p 515).  
4 As would also prove to be the case on “Black Wednesday,” 61 years later 
when Sterling again  proved vulnerable to currency speculation (see p.10 
below). 
5 No such commitment was made in the US until the 1960s. However, as the 
dominant world economy whose economic infra-structure was undamaged by 
the war, and who became the major supplier of capital and resources for 
European and Japanese recovery; the US economy had little need of 
government intervention to secure full employment. 
6 The coincidence of accelerating inflation and rising unemployment 
7 See his authoritative entry and extensive bibliography in,  The New Palgrave, a 
Dictionary of Economics, Volume 3, pps 293 – 296 (1987, London: MacMillan 
Press).   
8 Berk, 1994, Chapter 3, especially Tables 1 and 2, pps. 65 – 71. 
9 This is despite the reality that ‘No legal system acknowledges the claims that 
shareholders “own the company”’. (Deakin and Singh, 2008, p2.)  
10 See Cosh and Hughes (2008). This paper this papers endorses the earlier 
conclusions of Singh (1975, p. 954: ‘insofar as the neoclassical postulate of 
profit maximization relies on the doctrine of economic natural selection in the 
capital market (via the takeover mechanism) the empirical base for it is very 
weak’.  
11  In a process described by Chancellor Leo E. Strine as ‘the separation of 
ownership from ownership’ (Strine, 2007a). 
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12 Royal Bank of Scotland 2006. 
13 Bloomberg. 
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Appendix I:  Securitized debt instruments 
 
During the past two decades, securitized debt instruments have played a central 
role in the global financial crisis.  These investments are structured such that 
they operate in a hierarchy, based on the level of risk of the investor.  At the top, 
is the ‘super-senior’ tranche; the next tranche, the senior, is not serviced until 
the super-senior has been paid; ‘mezzanine’ investors are only paid once super-
senior and senior have been satisfied; at the bottom of the pile is the equity 
investor.  By way of example, n the event of the loss in the underlying 
securities, the equity investor might take the first 3 percent of losses; the various 
mezzanine tranches the next 9 percent; the senior tranche the next 10 percent; 
and only after 22 percent of losses have been absorbed would  the super-senior 
tranche be compromised.  (The precise parameters for the tranches – the 
‘attachment’ and ‘detachment’ points – may vary).  In this example, the investor 
in the equity position has, in effect, a 33 times leveraged position (100/3) in the 
underlying securities in the investment vehicle.  Rating agencies took the view 
that the statistical improbability of losses reaching the senior and super-senior 
tranches warranted an Aaa/AAA rating. 
 
For investors frustrated by the absence of yield in single-name credits, the super 
senior and senior tranches offered the opportunity to own very high grade credit 
at relatively attractive spreads.  Its appeal was further enhanced for banks by the 
Basel II accord, which lowered the capital risk weightings on securitized 
transactions rated Aa or better from 100 percent, to just 20 percent.  Similarly, 
US insurance regulators awarded their lowest regulatory capital requirements to 
the highest rated securities, regardless of what they comprised, enabling 
insurance companies to engage in ‘ratings arbitrage’, i.e., selecting investments 
which offered the highest yield for the rating without focusing on the underlying 
investment.   
 
As banks sold CDOs and CLOs, they had no problem finding buyers for the 
senior and super-senior tranches, especially since monoline and mainstream 
insurers such as AIG Financial Products were willing to use their own balance 
sheets to insure or ‘wrap’ these products, providing an extra layer of security.  
However, they were often left holding the high yielding but high risk equity 
tranches.  
 
The development of observed correlation markets and credit indices enabled 
banks to build their ‘correlation’ books from which single tranches could be 
sold and bought, allowing managers to construct and sell bespoke tranches 
without having to construct and sell the other parts of the capital structure.  In 
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addition, as market liquidity grew, small hedge funds proliferated, which were 
willing to commit investors’ capital to buy the higher risk equity tranches, 
yields on which seemed very attractive.  By way of example, at the market’s 
most bullish point in 2006, you could still expect returns of 15-16 percent on an 
equity tranche of the I-TRAXX index of European investment-grade corporate 
credits.  According to Moody’s, average cumulative issuer-rated global default 
rates over any five-year period from 1970-2007 for investment-grade corporates 
were only 1.058 percent (Moody’s Corporate Bond Default Study, 2008), which 
justified the huge implicit leverage in an equity position.  By comparison, 
returns on single-name BBB credits at the same period were wrapped around 1 
percent. 
 
As the market matured and yields in structured products became less exciting, 
increasingly esoteric structures were created, such as Constant Proportion Debt 
Obligations (CPDOs).  These invested in equity tranches referencing portfolios 
of investment-grade credit indices (e.g. I-Traxx), updated every six months, 
removing credits that were no longer investment grade.  Since an investment 
grade credit has minimal risk of default over six months, the agencies rated 
these instruments AAA/Aaa, making them eligible for even the most 
conservative investment portfolios.  In reality, CPDOs proved significantly 
more risky than their ratings suggested.  Firstly, widening spreads in the 
reference portfolio forced the instrument to ‘rebalance’ by adding leverage.  
Implicit in this was the assumption that credit spreads would benefit from ‘mean 
reversion’ i.e., they would tighten back to the average level of the proceeding 
years. 
 
Tight credit spreads resulting from excessive liquidity negated the mean 
reversion on which the CPDO rebalancing was based.  In addition, since the 
senior tranches were usually held by the arranging institution, CPDOs typically 
contained a ‘cash-out event’, which wound up the product once the net asset 
value fell below a set percentage of the funds invested.  This in itself would be 
indicative that the market was in distress.  As a result, the wind-up would 
almost inevitably be executed under fire sale conditions.  As an investor in the 
senior tranches, the arranger would get the bulk of the proceeds, leaving the 
equity tranche – the external investor to whom the instrument was sold – with 
very little.  Although only one of a family of esoteric products, these 
instruments attracted so much negative press that faith in the rating agencies 
was undermined because they were based, quite simply, on an arbitrage of a 
rating agency model. 
